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The debate over the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in a
world of capital mobility shows no signs of dying down. There is broad
awareness that the single factor that most distinguishes our current eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial environment from that of the preceding period is high
capital mobility. There is also a widely held view that while exposure to in-
ternational capital markets promises beneﬁts, those beneﬁts come packaged
with risks. But there is no consensus on what the IMF should do about it.
Should the Fund reduce its role as emergency lender on the grounds that
countries enjoy increasing access to markets as an alternative source of ﬁ-
nance? Or should it expand its role as relations with international ﬁnancial
markets expose countries to abrupt and potentially costly reversals in the di-
rection of capital ﬂows? Are existing IMF facilities adequate for these needs?
Or is there a case for a new facility capable of disbursing large amounts of ﬁ-
nancial assistance quickly, perhaps on the basis of prequaliﬁcation, to coun-
tries experiencing sudden shifts in the direction of capital ﬂows?1
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1. Two recent reviews of the debate that elaborate these points are Ostry and Zettelmeyer
(2005) and Truman (2005).More evidence may help to answer these questions. There exists sub-
stantial empirical literature on both shifts in the direction of capital ﬂows
(known by the moniker “sudden stops”) and the eﬀects of IMF-supported
programs (see tables 7.1 and 7.2). Empirical analyses focus on the impact
of policies and characteristics like a country’s exchange rate regime, ﬁnan-
cial openness, and dependence on international trade on the incidence,
magnitude, and eﬀects of sudden stops. Analyses of IMF-supported pro-
grams examine the behavior of inﬂation, output, ﬁscal eﬀort, and, most
relevant to the questions at hand, the balance of payments, compared to a
control group of country-year cases with no program in place. But, to our
knowledge, there exists no study focusing on the impact of such programs
on the incidence, severity, and eﬀects of sudden stops.
In this paper we take a ﬁrst stab at developing such evidence. Our results
suggest that IMF-supported programs and IMF credits reduce the likeli-
hood of sudden stops. There is some evidence that this stabilizing eﬀect is
stronger for countries with strong fundamentals. This can be interpreted in
terms of the literature on global capital account shocks and the stabilizing
eﬀect of liquidity insurance. Even countries with strong policies may expe-
rience a sudden curtailment of capital inﬂows and a shift to outﬂows if in-
vestors suspect that other investors for whatever reason are primed to take
their money out of the country. Emergency ﬁnancial assistance can then re-
assure individual investors of the country’s continued ability to ﬁnance its
international transactions and reduce their incentive to liquidate their po-
sitions. Emergency lending by the IMF can ensure the continued provision
of private ﬁnance in much the way that lender-of-last-resort intervention
by a central bank can limit the scope for bank runs. But if country funda-
mentals are weak, IMF ﬁnancial assistance may only come in the front
door and go out the back door with no impact on the incidence of the sud-
den stop.
There are reasons to treat these results with caution. There is the dif-
ﬁculty of measuring both IMF-supported programs and sudden stops.
There is the challenge of identifying the impact of the former on the lat-
ter—of addressing potential endogeneity. Our solutions to these problems
are imperfect. Our analysis also leaves open a variety of issues such as ap-
propriate modalities for lending to countries in this position, the feasibil-
ity of identifying qualifying countries in the relevant time frame, and moral
hazard. While these are not our topics in this paper, this does not mean
they are unimportant. Still, we believe that our results are the ﬁrst evidence
of the insurance properties of IMF-supported programs.
7.2 Sudden Stops and Multilateral Insurance
The fact that sudden stops cluster in time is taken as suggesting that they
have more to do with the behavior of global ﬁnancial markets than with
country policies, which some commentators take to imply that their 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.incidence would likely decline with the stepped-up provision of multilat-
eral insurance. Calvo (2005) takes the often rapid recovery of growth from
sudden stops as evidence that country policies are not at the root of this
phenomenon. He concludes that sudden stops in emerging market coun-
tries reﬂect ineﬃciencies in international ﬁnancial markets and argues for
emergency ﬁnancial assistance to countries suﬀering sharp interruptions
in capital ﬂows.2
A number of questions can be raised about this argument. One is why
countries cannot obtain insurance by establishing credit lines on interna-
tional capital markets or issuing securities with embedded options that
have the same insurance properties. If the argument for insurance is strong,
then the private sector should be prepared to provide it for a fee. This ob-
jection seems especially compelling in light of the recent growth of inter-
national ﬁnancial markets and transactions. It is not clear why contracting
for private insurance is not more widespread.3
• One possible explanation is that capital requirements and other regu-
lations prevent potential suppliers from providing insurance on the
requisite scale. Commercial counterparties may also be worried about
concentrated country exposures and demand a prohibitive price for
the provision of contingent credit lines. Still, if the case for private in-
surance is strong, ﬁnancial markets and institutions adept at diversi-
fying and repackaging risks should ﬁnd a way around these obstacles.
• Another possibility is adverse selection. If asymmetric information
prevents potential insurers from discriminating among borrowers in
diﬀerent risk categories, then only risky countries will wish to contract
for such lines. The higher are the fees and interest rates charged, the
greater will be the riskiness of willing clients, causing the private mar-
ket to collapse. The limitation of this argument is that insurers are far
from ignorant of variations in country risk. Thus, while information
asymmetry is a concern, especially when crisis conditions begin to de-
velop, lenders should still be able to establish ex ante diﬀerences in
charges for borrowers subject to diﬀerent levels of country risk.4
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2. Calvo’s preferred variant of the mechanism would have the stabilization fund purchase
the bonds of adversely aﬀected economies to prevent their spreads from rising (Calvo 2002).
3. There has, in fact, been some experimentation with private insurance by, inter alia, Ar-
gentina in the 1990s. (The experiment in question involved a contingent repurchase contract
between the Argentine central bank and a consortium of foreign banks, under which the cen-
tral bank was allowed to withdraw funds in the event of a crisis via a renewable credit line col-
laterialized by dollar-denominated government bonds.) But the Argentine credit line was
small, and execution was delayed until well into the crisis. There is also the recent develop-
ment of credit derivatives markets, which oﬀer the possibility of purchasing protection
against a range of emerging market credit events, although data on these markets are hard to
come by. This is especially true of their use—for obvious reasons—by emerging market sov-
ereigns.
4. A related argument is that a public insurance agency may have more ability or stronger
incentives to gather information on the ﬁnancial condition of its clients, in turn enabling it to• Yet another possibility is that commercial insurance providers have an
incentive to take a short position against the country when the latter is
likely to draw down its credit line. In turn this will destroy the eﬀec-
tiveness of the insurance (Broda and Levy Yeyati 2003). Presumably
this problem does not carry over to public insurance providers.5
A second question is whether bunching—that multiple countries tend to
experience sudden stops simultaneously—limits the feasibility of multilat-
eral insurance. If a substantial subset of IMF members needs to draw on
the resources of the Fund simultaneously because they experience shocks
simultaneously, then the ﬁnancial feasibility of an insurance arrangement
may be questionable.
A third question is whether it is, in fact, correct that sudden stops are 
not really a function of country policies. Empirical analyses from Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) to Edwards (2005) identify roles for both in-
ternal and external factors.6 Insofar as the relevant characteristics include
policies under the control of the domestic authorities, this means that the
moral hazard problem must be addressed.7
Moral hazard does not render insurance infeasible, but it requires that a
reasonable insurance scheme be designed to limit its extent. An obvious
way of doing so is through surveillance and conditionality. A key question
is whether such conditions are better applied ex post or ex ante. Speciﬁ-
cally, should the IMF announce in advance what countries are eligible for
Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs 231
better tailor incentive-compatible contracts. The obvious objection here is that private ﬁnan-
cial institutions with their own performance at stake have at least as strong an incentive to in-
vest in these monitoring functions.
5. This problem would be ameliorated if the insurance liability was securitized and widely
distributed as diversiﬁcation would then provide the insurers with the protection they need
(obviating the need to hedge on a large scale). But in turn this begs the question of why emerg-
ing market countries ﬁnd it hard to place innovative securities containing put and call options
that kick in, reducing debt service or even calling for reverse payments, when economic con-
ditions deteriorate.
6. To quote Calvo (2005, 26), “Econometric studies do not reject the hypothesis that Sud-
den Stops are largely prompted by external factors but, at the same time, strongly suggest that
the probability of Sudden Stops reﬂects domestic characteristics.” In other words, even ana-
lysts emphasizing the importance of global factors acknowledge that domestic characteristics
shape the impact and response to external shocks.
7. The extent and economic importance of moral hazard in this context is disputed; for a
review of the evidence, see Lane and Phillips (2000). There is also the possibility that, in the
presence of other distortions, adding insurance will lead to less risk taking rather than more.
Thus, in a model of ﬁnite-lived governments, where the probability of government survival
declines with the incidence of ﬁnancial crises, Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2004) show that in-
surance, by reducing the risk of ﬁnancial collapse, may in fact encourage the authorities to in-
vest more in policy reform (in the present context, to reduce the riskiness of their policies). Of
course, there are actually two eﬀects of insurance here: insurance reduces the pressure on the
government to head oﬀ a crisis, but it also strengthens the incentive to pursue reforms that
pay oﬀ in the future. Predictably, the net eﬀect is ambiguous. Cordella and Levy Yeyati show
that insurance is more likely to encourage reforms that pay oﬀ in good times (because it re-
duces the risk of falling into a crisis in the ﬁrst place) than reforms that reduce the risk of a
crisis in the event that one occurs.a credit line and specify the amount of assistance that they can expect to
receive? Or should it proceed on a case-by-case basis and decide whether
to provide additional credit once the sudden stop and the severity of the
output decline have been observed?
Those who argue for insurance against sudden stops generally favor ex
ante contracts. First, the problems of illiquidity that arise when capital
ﬂows are interrupted can lead to problems of insolvency unless funds are
disbursed quickly. Determining eligibility quickly requires that countries
be deemed eligible for assistance ex ante. Second, if the terms and amounts
of external assistance are speciﬁed ex ante, then the government has a
stronger incentive to take steps to expedite the economy’s recovery from
the sudden stop.
Cohen and Portes (2004) describe an insurance contract in which coun-
tries prequalify for assistance if their debt ratios remain below a critical
ceiling consistent with moderate spreads, say 400 basis points above Lon-
don Interbank Oﬀered Rate (LIBOR). By assumption, any crisis that the
country then experiences is a crisis of liquidity, not a crisis of debt sustain-
ability. Payments are triggered when spreads on the debt rise above the
threshold level. The IMF would then lend to the country at the threshold
spread. It would thus contain the eﬀects of the sudden stop that caused
spreads to rise and prevent the liquidity crisis from degenerating into a sol-
vency crisis. Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005) propose a country insurance
facility that would provide eligible countries with automatic access to a
credit line at a predetermined interest rate, where eligibility criteria would
again focus on debt sustainability—not just the level of the debt but also its
maturity and currency composition. Dervis and Ozer (2005) similarly pro-
pose a Stability and Growth Facility that would provide insurance against
unforeseen shocks and for which countries would prequalify on the basis
of their policies.
Chami, Sharma, and Shim (2004) provide a model laying out the ana-
lytics of this approach. They assume that the insurer has two objectives:
safeguarding its assets and providing for the borrowing country’s welfare,
which it can enhance by extending a loan. A governmental counterparty
decides in each of two periods how much unobserved eﬀort to exert in or-
der to avoid and, if necessary, recover from a ﬁnancial crisis, which in turn
aﬀects how much will be asked to repay to the insurance pool.
In this model it is preferable for the insurer to specify eligibility and the
terms of the credit line—how much assistance will be extended as a func-
tion of the severity of the decline in output that occurs in the ﬁrst period—
before the country enters a crisis and the full output consequences are re-
vealed. Knowing that it stands to receive oﬃcial support, the eﬀorts of the
national authorities to avert the crisis are correspondingly less. But the ex-
tent of the moral hazard aﬀecting the authorities’ eﬀorts to recover from the
232 Barry Eichengreen, Poonam Gupta, and Ashoka Modycrisis varies with the form of the contract. Under an ex post contract, the
crisis country repays more if it makes a greater eﬀort to recover from the cri-
sis, which works to depress adjustment eﬀort. In contrast, under the ex ante
contract, when terms are agreed prior to the government’s decision of how
much adjustment eﬀort to extend, repayment is independent of eﬀort;
hence adjustment will be greater, and outcomes will be superior. In general,
an insurer that both has a ﬁduciary responsibility to safeguard its assets and
that cares about the welfare of the crisis country will prefer an ex ante con-
tract in which the operator of the reserve pool speciﬁes who is eligible and
the terms and amounts of the assistance that will be forthcoming.
But there may be a problem of time consistency with the ex ante con-
tract. The insurer may want to renege on its ﬁxed commitment if it observes
that the recession is unusually severe. Because it values the welfare of the
insured, it may then wish to oﬀer more generous terms. Hence ex ante con-
tracts ﬁxing the amount and terms of the credit line will not be credible.
And because the insured knows this, moral hazard lending to less adjust-
ment eﬀort will still be a problem, surveillance and conditionality or not.8
This suggests that the IMF may wish to deem certain countries eligible
for a ﬁxed credit line as this is better than a discretionary, case-by-case ap-
proach at preserving its ﬁnancial solvency, while at the same time support-
ing the welfare of its members, but that the time-consistency problem may
undermine the feasibility of this approach and aggravate moral hazard.
And if moral hazard is serious, such an insurance arrangement may turn
out to be welfare reducing rather than welfare improving for the member-
ship as a whole.
Two further questions can be raised about these ideas. First, doesn’t the
unsatisfactory experience of the IMF’s contingent credit line (CCL), for
which no country applied prior to its expiration in 2003, raise questions
about the enthusiasm of countries for ex ante insurance? Insofar as execu-
tive directors have a responsibility for the IMF’s own solvency, members
running risky policies that may prevent them from paying back credits
would have to be denied the privilege of borrowing. Such an outcome
would send a negative signal to the markets. This seems to have been what
deterred governments from applying for a CCL. A further problem was
that eligibility could be rescinded at some future date, sending a negative
signal that might precipitate a crisis.
The Fund could meet its ﬁduciary responsibility by announcing unilat-
erally which members were eligible for ﬁnancial assistance. But it would
then send a negative signal about the ﬁnancial condition of other countries
when it declared them ineligible for insurance. In turn this might render
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8. Theoretically, this problem could be solved by repeated interaction between the insurer
and the country, through which the former develops a reputation for acting consistently.countries reluctant to participate in the insurance arrangement in the ﬁrst
place. And the exit problem would remain.9
Finally, such schemes assume the ability of the agency operating the fa-
cility to discriminate between solvent and insolvent countries, where the
solvent countries are still susceptible to liquidity crises and should thus be
made automatic beneﬁciaries of the new facility. Cohen and Portes (2004)
assume the existence of a well-deﬁned amount of debt that forms the ceil-
ing on what is sustainable and a stable linkage running from debt levels to
spreads. Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005) argue that a ceiling should be de-
ﬁned for the overall debt-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio but also rec-
ommend that foreign-currency debt and short-term debt should receive
heavier weights in the calculation of this total. They suggest imposing a
ceiling on the ﬁscal deﬁcit in each of the preceding three years.
In the real world, sustainability depends on forecasts of future growth
rates and interest rates that are disputable and uncertain. It depends on es-
timates of the political will of a government and society to mobilize and
transfer resources for purposes of debt service. Given this uncertainty, it
seems unavoidable that any insurance facility will occasionally lend to
countries that ﬁnd it impossible to repay. Or it will not lend to countries
whose problems are liquidity related, leading to complaints and recrimi-
nation. Any automatic scheme that depends on the existence of an opera-
tional distinction between insolvent and illiquid crisis countries is unlikely
to be feasible in practice.10
7.3 Capital Flows and Sudden Stops
As our measure of capital ﬂows we use the ﬁnancial account balance, a
summary measure of net capital ﬂows that includes net foreign direct in-
vestment, net portfolio investment, and other investments. The advantage
of this measure is its comprehensiveness; in principle, it should capture net
capital ﬂows of all kinds.11 One exception is that it does not include oﬃcial
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9. Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2005) suggest “smoothing” the eligibility criteria so that ex-
ogenous shocks temporarily pushing a country above the eligibility threshold do not precip-
itate a sudden jump in interest rates or a crisis. While this might help for small exogenous
shocks that the authorities wish to oﬀset, it will not help for large exogenous shocks that can-
not be oﬀset in the medium term.
10. This argument is developed and defended at greater length in Eichengreen (2000).
11. Other investigators, presumably with stronger priors about which capital ﬂows are the
primary source of instability, have focused on narrower measures (considering only ﬁnancial
ﬂows for example) or on the change in gross rather than net inﬂows. Some have adjusted their
preferred measure of capital ﬂows for identiﬁable exogenous shocks to the current account
(exports, the terms of trade, etc.). Some will argue for the exclusion of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) from the capital ﬂow measure on the grounds that FDI ﬂows are more stable and
less prone to sudden stops. However, this conclusion is not universally accepted (for a ﬂavor
of the debate, see, e.g., Sarno and Taylor 1999). If FDI inﬂows fall dramatically, this is as
much a problem for capital-importing countries as if portfolio inﬂows fall abruptly. This ap-
proach is not without implications for our sample of sudden-stop cases; see note 16.transfers associated with IMF programs, a fact that is important for what
follows.
Following Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) and Cavallo and Frankel
(2004), we consider both the ﬁrst and the second moments of the capital
ﬂow series in identifying sudden stops. First, we identify the years where
the ﬁnancial account balance exhibited a large decline relative to its long-
term average. We require this to be a large discrete drop and not just a cor-
rection of a large temporary inﬂow. Second, we calculate the mean and
one-standard-deviation band of the ﬁnancial account balance using the
data up to the years identiﬁed in the ﬁrst stage as potential sudden stops
and retain only years that qualify on the basis of this criterion.12 Other au-
thors have used two-standard-deviation bands, but because we are using
annual data, a two-standard-deviation criterion turns out to be very strict.
Our empirical analysis focuses on emerging market countries signiﬁ-
cantly involved with international capital markets. For the period 1980 
to 2003, we identiﬁed twenty-four such countries (listed in appendix A),
which in turn experienced thirty-ﬁve sudden stop episodes.13 Our dates are
very similar to those of Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) and Cavallo
and Frankel (2004). However, they diﬀer from those of Edwards (2005),
where a sudden stop is said to occur when a country had previously been
receiving signiﬁcant capital inﬂows (where it ranked in its region’s third
quartile in terms of capital inﬂows in the two previous years) and their vol-
ume declines by at least 5 percent of GDP in a given year. This is a lenient
criterion that tends to capture episodes where the ﬁnancial account bal-
ance declines only from, say, 20 percent to 15 percent of GDP, as well as
episodes where there is a correction of a temporary increase in the balance
the year before.14
For this group of countries we present descriptive statistics for the
twenty-four year period 1980 to 2003.15 In our sample, there a 5.5 percent
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12. The moments were calculated using data up to the crisis year and not including the po-
tential crisis year.
13. The “signiﬁcant contact with international capital markets” criterion means that not all
countries feature for the full length of the period. Thus, of the countries that transitioned
from central planning, we include only Hungary and Poland and only after 1990, when they
had moved signiﬁcantly toward functioning markets. We include Bangladesh, Bolivia,
Ghana, and Pakistan, which were recipients of concessional ﬁnance and were not as exposed
to large market-based capital inﬂows. But even if these last four countries are dropped from
the regression analysis, our ﬁndings remain robust, as we report in the following.
14. We note the omission from this list of a couple of cases—Russia and Brazil in 1999—
that feature prominently in qualitative discussions of capital market disruptions. For Russia,
the short time series precluded the estimation of a reliable measure of standard deviation of
the ﬁnancial account. Brazil in 1999 is a close call by our measure; in this instance, the decline
in portfolio and bank ﬂows was oﬀset by an increase in FDI, cushioning the decline in the ﬁ-
nancial account. In the section on robustness checks in the following, we show that the key re-
sults remain the same when we treat these observations as sudden stop cases.
15. For purposes of regression analysis, however, we concentrate on the period 1990
through 2003, when capital ﬂows to emerging market countries, bond-market intermediatedprobability of a sudden stop in a given country in a given year. Figure 7.1
shows the time proﬁle of these events. There is a clear bunching of sudden
stops, as emphasized by Calvo (2005). Peaks coincide with the 1982 debt
crisis, the Asian crisis of 1997, and the aftermath of the Argentine crisis in
2002. Typically, countries experience a net capital outﬂow on the order of
5 percent of GDP in the ﬁrst year of a sudden stop episode (ﬁgure 7.2).The
swing in the net portfolio capital ﬂow is on the order of 2 percent of GDP.
In contrast, there is no discernible impact on net FDI ﬂows.16 By implica-
tion, net capital outﬂows consist mostly of other forms of capital, such as
funds channeled through the banking system, commercial credits, and so
forth (see also table 7.3).
Typically, countries experiencing a sudden stop also experience an im-
provement in the current account balance on the order of 4 percent of GDP
(ﬁgure 7.3). Note that we are not looking here at “current account rever-
sals,” where a current account reversal is typically deﬁned as an episode
when there is a large reduction in the size of an existing current account
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ﬂows in particular, were especially prominent. It is this subperiod that is most relevant for
thinking about the future. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) also consider the period since
1990. They draw a sample of ﬁfteen emerging market economies and also include seventeen
developed economies in their sample. By using monthly data, they are able to increase the
number of their observations. Note that to ensure that our ﬁndings are not dictated by the pe-
riod considered, in the section on robustness checks we also present regressions covering a
longer period.
16. Recall that in the preceding we addressed the question of whether it was appropriate to
include changes in net FDI in our measure of sudden stops and argued that the answer is yes
on the grounds that one should not prejudge the stability of diﬀerent forms of imported cap-
ital. Figure 7.2 suggests that this procedure does not have strong implications for our ﬁndings.
Fig. 7.1 Year-wise probability of a sudden stop
Source: Authors’ calculations.Fig. 7.2 Magnitude and composition of ﬁnancial ﬂows (in percent of GDP): 
A, Financial account balance; B, Net FDI ﬂows; C, Net portfolio ﬂows; C, Net 
other ﬂows
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 7.3 Magnitude and composition of capital ﬂows during and prior to sudden
stops (percentage of GDP)
Three year average  During the ﬁrst year 
prior to a sudden stop of a sudden stop
Total net ﬁnancial inﬂows 4.2 –4.6
(6.8) (4.8)
Net FDI 1.5 1.2
(1.9) (1.6)
Net portfolio ﬂows .62 –.21
(1.5) (1.46)
Net other capital ﬂows of which: 2.1 –5.6
(6.5) (4.6)
Net government ﬂows .52 –1.2
(2.8) (3.5)
Net banks ﬂows .82 –2.0
(3.6) (3.0)
Net other ﬂows .92 –1.9
(3.1) (3.6)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.deﬁcit; rather, we are summarizing the average behavior of the current ac-
count balance in our episodes of capital account reversal. The current
account being the diﬀerence between savings and investment, the conse-
quences are necessarily reﬂected in these variables. Figure 7.3 shows that the
action is mainly on the investment side—that capital formation declines
sharply. It follows that GDP growth is close to zero although it rebounds
after one year. A statistical summary of these patterns is in table 7.4.
Sudden stops are also not the same as currency crises. For comparison,
we use crisis dates from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Berg and Patillo
(1999), Frankel and Rose (1996), and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998).17
Only about one-third of the sudden stops in our sample are associated with
contemporaneous currency crises (see the ﬁrst panel of table 7.5). The pic-
ture is the same when we lag the currency crises (as in the second panel of
table 7.5). While we have fewer observations for banking crises, a larger
share of sudden stops (about a half) appears to coincide with banking
crises (see third panel of table 7.5).18
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17. For recent years we supplement these with the dates from Frankel and Wei (2004).
These data are merged following the procedures in Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2003).
18. This suggests a complex relationship between sudden stops, currency crises, and bank-
ing crises—which we leave for another paper.
Fig. 7.3 Macroeconomic eﬀects of sudden stops: A, Gross capital formation
(percentage of GDP); B, Current account balance (percentage of GDP); C, Real
growth of GDP
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Table 7.4 Real effects of sudden stops
Three year average  During the ﬁrst year 
prior to a sudden stop of a sudden stop
Current account balance (% of GDP) –4.2 –0.20
(5.2) (6.2)
Real growth 3.7 0.39
(4.2) (5.5)
Export growth 1.2 1.2
(5.4) (4.1)
Capital formation (% of GDP) 25.3 22.5
(7.4) (6.9)
Fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 23.8 20.8
(6.6) (6.5)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Table 7.5 Sudden stops and banking and currency crises
No CC CC Total
A. Sudden stops and currency crises
No SS 546 45 591
SS 23 10 33
Total 569 55 624
B. Sudden stops and lagged currency crises
No CC (Lag) CC (Lag) Total
No SS 544 47 591
SS 25 8 33
Total 569 55 624
C. Sudden stops and banking crises
No BC BC Total
No SS 430 133 563
SS 13 15 28
Total 443 148 591
D. Sudden stops and lagged banking crises
No BC (Lag) BC (Lag) Total
No SS 412 135 547
SS 20 8 28
Total 432 143 575
Note: SS = sudden stops; BC = banking crises; CC = currency crises.7.4 IMF-Supported Programs
Information on IMF programs is drawn from a data base maintained by
the Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department. We have infor-
mation on the years in which a program started and ended, whether it was
precautionary from the outset or turned precautionary in the course of its
operation, the value of the funds approved, and the amount used under the
program. (Under precautionary programs, the IMF and the country agree
on conditionality and monitoring, but the country declares its intention to
not draw on resources from the Fund, though this declaration is not bind-
ing.) Slightly more than 12 percent of the Fund programs in our sample
were precautionary from the start.19
Table 7.6 is a ﬁrst look at the association of Fund programs and sudden
stops. We diﬀerentiate between “new” programs initiated in either of the
two years prior to the sudden stop, and “existing” programs in place in still
earlier years.20 In approximately a third of sudden stop cases, a new IMF
program was negotiated in one of the two years immediately preceding the
sudden stop, and in 20 percent of the sudden stop cases a program was al-
ready in place in still earlier years. Whereas the unconditional probability
of a sudden stop in our sample is 5.5 percent, the probability of a sudden
stop is about 1 percentage point lower if an IMF program was in place
(whether the program was contracted in the two immediately preceding
years or existed previously). This with and without IMF program diﬀeren-
tial is more pronounced if we limit ourselves to data for the period after
1989.
The raw data are consistent with the idea that whether a Fund program
is in place matters for consumption, the trade balance, and the current ac-
count. Here the averages (in ﬁgure 7.4) refer to all programs, whether initi-
ated in the two years immediately preceding the crisis or prior to that. Pro-
gram countries indicated by the broken line receive access to credit from
the IMF that enables them, not surprisingly, to run larger current account
deﬁcits (or smaller surpluses) and to maintain higher levels of consump-
tion. The impact on the other variables is unclear. Program countries ap-
pear to enjoy more stable portfolio capital ﬂows following the sudden stop,
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19. We use the outstanding amount of the credit disbursed. The alternative is to use the “ap-
proved” lending amount, that is, the amount that a country can draw on. The approved
amount has the advantage of measuring the prospective envelope of resources. However, the
country must go through a review process to access those resources. In practice the results
were more robust when we used the outstanding credit variable. The implication is that where
programs were precautionary and no amounts were disbursed, IMF credit should take on a
value of zero. This is the approach we use to testing separately for the inﬂuence of precau-
tionary programs in what follows. Finally, because the outstanding credit also includes funds
borrowed by a country under concessional credit programs, we check in our robustness anal-
ysis if dropping those countries (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ghana, and Pakistan) makes a diﬀer-
ence to our results (the answer is that it does not).
20. The rationale for this will become clear in the following.but investment is no stronger, and the recovery of growth is not obviously
superior.
7.5 Multivariate Analysis
We now present a regression analysis of the association of IMF pro-
grams with sudden stops, conditioning on other determinants of the
change in the ﬁnancial accounts and instrumenting for the endogeneity of
the program variable. This section presents the benchmark regressions
with just the conditioning variables. The choice of conditioning factors is
important as omitting an important country-speciﬁc or global determi-
nant of the risk of sudden stops creates the danger that we may incorrectly
impute this risk to the presence or absence of an IMF program.
We construct the dependent variable two ways: ﬁrst, as a simple binary
indicator equaling one in the ﬁrst year of a sudden stop; second, as the ﬁ-
nancial account balance if and only if a sudden stop occurred as a way of
capturing the severity of the event.21 Regressions using the ﬁrst dependent
variable are estimated by probit (we report the marginal probabilities),
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21. In addition to the ﬁnancial account balance, we also look at the change in ﬁnancial
account balance in the year of the sudden stop as compared to the average of presudden 
stop years. The two measures are highly correlated, and the results are similar across the two
measures.
Table 7.6 IMF-supported programs and sudden stops: Number of sample
observations
IMF Program
Sudden Stop No Yes Total
A. New IMF-supported programs and sudden stops (1980–2003)
No 396 256 652
Yes 26 13 39
Total 422 269 691
B. New or existing IMF-supported programs and sudden stops (1980–2003)
No 300 373 673
12 1 1 8 3 9
Total 321 391 712
C. New IMF-supported programs and sudden stops (1990–2003)
No 261 148 409
Yes 18 6 24
Total 279 154 433
D. New or existing IMF-supported programs and sudden stops (1990–2003)
No 185 224 409
Yes 15 9 24
Total 200 233 433while regressions using the second dependent variable are estimated by To-
bit. In principle, the Tobit regressions should make more complete use of
the available information. Country ﬁxed eﬀects are used throughout. But
because we also use global time-varying variables, time-period ﬁxed eﬀects
are not included in the analysis of sudden stops.
The benchmark regressions for the determinants of sudden stops in table
7.7 suggest that global factors matter, as emphasized by, inter alia, Calvo
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Fig. 7.4 IMF-supported programs and eﬀects of sudden stops: A, Financial ac-
count balance (as percentage of GDP); B, Current account balance (as percentage
of GDP); C, Net other ﬂows (as percentage of GDP); D, Real growth; E, Capital
formation (as percentage of GDP); F, Net portfolio ﬂows (as percentage of GDP)
Source: Authors’ calculations.(2005), although the obvious suspects are not always prominent.22The U.S.
high-yield spread (the spread over risk-free U.S. government bonds) is gen-
erally positive and on the margin of signiﬁcance. The high-yield spread is
often used as a measure of the global risk premium, with the implication
that a rise in the risk premium can trigger reversals in capital ﬂows to
emerging markets. At its strongest, the coeﬃcient estimate implies that
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22. We do not claim that we provide here a deﬁnitive analysis of the role of global factors
in sudden stops—nor do we attempt to do so, given that the available space is fully occupied
by our analysis of the eﬀects of IMF programs. But this deserves to be a high priority for fu-
ture work on the feasibility of an insurance facility, insofar as the importance of common
global factors is directly related to the capacity of the IMF as a ﬁnancial pool to provide as-
sistance to diﬀerent countries experiencing sudden stops.
Table 7.7 Determinants of sudden stops
Indicator for the ﬁrst year of sudden stop
Dependent variable 1990–2003 1984–2003
Treasury bill rate 0.007
[0.97]
High yield spread 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.012* 0.013*
[1.36] [1.08] [1.61] [1.68] [1.88]
Change in real oil prices –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.001***
[3.29] [3.08] [2.98] [3.10] [2.91]
GDP growth 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008** 0.007** 0.0001
[3.15] [3.11] [2.12] [1.99] [0.05]
Trade balance/GDP –0.006* –0.006 –0.006 –0.007* –0.008***
[1.73] [1.63] [1.51] [1.74] [2.70]
Debt servicing/Exports 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 0.001
[1.64] [1.64] [1.81] [1.89] [0.99]
Domestic credit/GDP 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002***
[2.69] [2.49] [2.25] [2.35] [3.04]
Change in domestic credit/GDP 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.003**
[2.99] [2.91] [2.47] [2.72] [2.05]
Debt/GDP 0.003*** 0.003***
[2.87] [2.83]
Change in debt/GDP 0.001 0.001 0.001
[1.23] [1.25] [0.86]
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects No No No No No
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.17
No. of observations 227 227 227 227 332
Notes: Columns reporting probit results present marginal probabilities, based on the STATA command
“dprobit.” Robust z statistics are presented in brackets.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.every 100 basis point increase in this spread increases the probability of a
sudden stop by between 1 and 1.5 percentage points. In contrast, the U.S.
treasury bill rate is not signiﬁcant.23 A somewhat surprising result is that
an increase in the real price of oil appears to reduce the risk of a sudden
stop—surprising because many emerging markets countries are net oil im-
porters. However, not all emerging market economies are oil importers; in-
deed, some of those that have been historically most susceptible to sudden
stops are substantial oil exporters. High oil prices tend to coincide with
high commodity prices generally, and it is not surprising that emerging
market countries, many of which are commodity exporters, enjoy larger
and steadier capital inﬂows when commodity prices move in their favor.
Moreover, a rise in oil prices also improves global liquidity because oil-rich
nations run balance of payments surpluses that need to be reinvested, and
this may work to the advantage of emerging market countries.
Among the country-speciﬁc factors, high and rising ratios of domestic
credit to GDP are strongly associated with sudden stops, as emphasized in
the credit-boom literature (IMF 2004). There is some suggestion that peri-
ods of rapid growth associated with credit expansions are likely to end in
sudden stops.24 Presumably, some of these high credit growth episodes are
fuelled by the inﬂow of foreign capital, which can reverse abruptly. A high
ratio of debt to GDP (in levels but not rate-of-change form) also increases
is vulnerability. A smaller trade balance and a larger ratio of debt service
to exports increase the likelihood of a sudden stop. The message seems to
be that the combination of a domestic credit boom and the emergence of
external payment risks heightens the risk of a sudden stop.
A variety of sensitivity analyses left these basic results unchanged.
• We dropped the country dummies, thus adding cross-section variation,
without signiﬁcantly altering our ﬁndings. However, it remains the case
that most of the variation in the dependent variable is still explained 
by within-country variations rather than by cross-country diﬀerences.
• Results for the longer period 1984 to 2003, in the last column of table
7.7, continue to produce qualitatively similar ﬁndings.
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23. That the usual measures of global ﬁnancial stress are not prominent in their explana-
tion of the incidence of sudden stops is not necessarily inconsistent with their bunching in
time. It is possible that measures of “common vulnerability” may attract the attention of in-
ternational investors, causing them to retreat from a broad range of countries (see Mody and
Taylor 2003). As such, country factors remain important in understanding the frequency of
sudden stops. A previous study showing that the correlation between changes in U.S. Trea-
sury yields and capital ﬂows to emerging markets was not always stable (that the correlation
depended on the reason behind the change in U.S. Treasury yields) is Eichengreen and Mody
(1998).
24. As in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), we also included a measure of dollarization.
Conﬁrming their ﬁnding, dollarization is associated with a higher probability of a sudden
stop. However, our other ﬁndings do not change, and we do not include dollarization in the
regressions to preserve the sample size.• We relaxed our stringent criteria and mechanical procedures for iden-
tifying sudden stop episodes, adding additional borderline cases such
as Russia and Brazil at the end of the 1990s. Again, the results carried
over.25
• Using the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes, we
added dummy variables for pegged rates and regimes of limited ﬂexi-
bility (managed- and freely-ﬂoating regimes are the omitted alterna-
tive).26We ﬁnd (in table 7.8) that the more rigid the regime, the greater
the likelihood of a sudden stop.27 This negative association of sudden
stops with exchange rate ﬂexibility is consistent with the literature in
which it is argued that currency ﬂexibility encourages creditors and
debtors to more fully internalize the risks of foreign lending and bor-
rowing (see, e.g., Goldstein 1998). This is also the same result as in Ed-
wards (2005). While the vector of exchange rate regime variables is not
signiﬁcant here, it turns out to be signiﬁcant in some of the additional
speciﬁcations below.28
• Because exchange rate regime and capital account regime choices are
related, we also considered the eﬀects of ﬁnancial opening. We use a
one-period lag of the Mody and Murshid (2005) measure of ﬁnancial
integration.29 The point estimate (again in table 7.8) suggests that
countries that are more deeply integrated with global ﬁnancial mar-
kets are less vulnerable to sudden stops, as if countries better inte-
grated into international ﬁnancial markets have stronger institutions.
Again, this is the same result as in Edwards (2005). And although this
variable is also not signiﬁcant here, it turns out to be signiﬁcant in
some of the further speciﬁcations in the following.
7.6 IMF Programs and Sudden Stops
Table 7.9 adds IMF programs. Recall that we distinguish “existing” pro-
grams (in place at least two years prior to the occurrence of the sudden stop)
from “new” programs negotiated in the immediately preceding two years.
The coeﬃcient on preexisting programs is arguably less contaminated by
simultaneity (which should in any case bias the coeﬃcient in a positive di-
rection, the opposite of the sign we ﬁnd). Preexisting programs, as a mea-
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25. Similarly, all the results reported in the following continue to obtain when we add these
borderline cases to our list of sudden stop episodes.
26. See Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004). In principle, it captures the de facto operative regime.
27. Although the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant, it is found to be signiﬁcant in the later
tables.
28. Note, however, that the new IMF classiﬁcation of exchange rates produces more am-
biguous results.
29. The ﬁnancial integration index is based on four measures of the intensity of capital con-
trols that are published in the IMF’s annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions.sure of the IMF’s ongoing commitment to the country, may also have a
stronger signaling eﬀect. In practice, we ﬁnd that both preexisting and new
programs negatively aﬀect the probability of a sudden stop. In the present
speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient on new programs is larger in absolute value,
although it does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from that on existing programs.30
The insurance analogy is sometimes taken as an argument for excep-
tional access—as justifying a credit line suﬃciently large to reassure private
investors. This suggests distinguishing eﬀects by the size of the program.
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30. The size of the coeﬃcients diﬀers more noticeably when we correct for endogeneity, as
suggested by the observation that preexisting programs should be less contaminated by this
bias (see the following).
Table 7.8 Financial mobility, exchange rate regimes, and sudden stops
Dependent variable Indicator for ﬁrst year of sudden stop
High yield spread 0.012* 0.013* 0.011 0.012*
[1.84] [1.91] [1.61] [1.73]
Change in real oil prices –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002*** –0.002***
[3.11] [3.08] [3.17] [3.19]
GDP growth 0.007** 0.007** 0.007* 0.007**
[2.16] [2.21] [1.90] [2.02]
Trade balance/GDP –0.006 –0.007* –0.007* –0.008**
[1.47] [1.66] [1.76] [2.08]
Debt servicing/Exports 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
[2.03] [2.01] [2.05] [2.09]
Domestic credit/GDP 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**
[2.41] [2.28] [2.35] [2.41]
Change in domestic credit/GDP 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
[2.68] [2.70] [2.75] [2.82]
Exchange rate regime: Pegged 0.028 0.033
[0.54] [0.61]
Exchange rate regime: Limited ﬂexibility 0.03 0.03
[0.69] [0.53]
Exchange rate regime: Pegged (IMF) –0.03 –0.04
[1.15] [1.27]
Exchange rate regime: Limited ﬂexibility (IMF) 0.02 0.02
[0.52] [0.57]
Financial mobility –0.01 –0.02
[0.75] [1.06]
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects No No No No
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
No. of observations 227 227 227 227
Note: See table 7.7 notes.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.We do so in two ways, scaling programs by short-term external debt and
GDP. Both ratios are lagged by one period. International Monetary Fund
credit as a share of GDP is negative and signiﬁcant at conventional conﬁ-
dence levels, but not so IMF credit scaled by short-term debt.
Next we test for whether IMF programs have a more powerful preemp-
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Table 7.9 IMF program and probability of sudden stops (probit estimates)
Dependent variable Indicator for ﬁrst year of sudden stop
High yield spread 0.011* 0.011** 0.011* 0.012** 0.006
[1.81] [1.98] [1.94] [2.04] [1.03]
Change in real oil prices –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
[3.15] [3.19] [3.18] [3.10] [3.69]
GDP growth 0.006* 0.007** 0.007* 0.007** 0.009***
[1.73] [2.00] [1.93] [2.11] [2.66]
Trade balance/GDP –0.005 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003 –0.003
[1.37] [0.63] [0.62] [0.96] [0.99]
Debt servicing/Exports 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001
[2.29] [2.69] [2.70] [2.46] [1.49]
Domestic credit/GDP 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
[2.66] [3.08] [3.06] [3.02] [2.95]
Change in domestic credit/GDP 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004***
[2.63] [2.53] [2.49] [2.59] [3.18]
Exchange rate regime: Pegged 0.067 0.07 0.071 0.069 0.022
[1.14] [1.23] [1.24] [1.20] [0.53]
Exchange rate regime: Limited ﬂexibility 0.007 –0.006 –0.005 –0.006 –0.003
[0.20] [0.20] [0.16] [0.19] [0.11]
Financial mobility –0.018 –0.017 –0.016 –0.017 –0.016
[1.45] [1.59] [1.40] [1.52] [1.51]
Existing IMF program –0.054*** –0.046** –0.046** –0.049** –0.043**
[2.98] [2.57] [2.56] [2.56] [2.47]
New IMF program –0.053*** –0.042* –0.041 –0.047* –0.040
[1.99] [1.73] [1.63] [1.81] [1.64]
New program   Fundamentals 0.046**
[2.32]
Precautionary IMF program –0.014 –0.01
[0.51] [0.38]
IMF credit/GDP –0.008* –0.008*
[1.66] [1.66]
IMF credit/Short-term debt –.0001 –.0001
[0.63] [0.84]
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects No No No No No
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.30
No. of observations 227 217 217 217 217
Note: See table 7.7 notes.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.tive eﬀect in countries with strong fundamentals, as suggested by the in-
surance analogy. We construct the ﬁrst principal component of the vector
of variables capturing country policies and conditions included in table
7.9.31 We normalize the resulting variable so that it has zero mean and so
that a positive value indicates worsening fundamentals. We then interact
the resulting index of fundamentals with the new IMF program variable.
The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction term in table 7.9
suggests that as the strength of domestic fundamentals declines, the eﬀec-
tiveness of IMF programs in reducing the likelihood of a sudden stop di-
minishes.32
A key question is whether the negative association of programs and sud-
den stops reﬂects causality running from the latter to the former. Actually,
it is not clear that endogeneity is a serious problem; one can argue that re-
verse causality should bias the coeﬃcient toward zero because a sudden
stop will increase the likelihood of a Fund program and thus produce a pos-
itive relationship, whereas we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient.33Be that as it may,
the appropriate treatment is instrumental variables. These authors argue
that decision making in the Fund is inﬂuenced by the organization’s prin-
cipal shareholders, above all the United States. They model the likelihood
of a program as a function not just of country characteristics but also of its
links with the United States.34 To capture the latter they include U.S. aid as
a percentage of total foreign aid received by the country and the share of
votes in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in which the country
voted the same way as the United States, both lagged.35 In our sample, U.S.
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31. We use high-yield spreads, oil prices, real GDP growth, the trade balance-GDP ratio,
the debt service-export ratio, and the domestic credit measure in calculating principal com-
ponents. The ﬁrst principal component captures 21 percent of the variation in the underlying
series. In theory it would be possible to interact the IMF program dummy with each of the
variables used to represent fundamentals (or to include additional principal components be-
yond the ﬁrst), but this creates problems of multicollinearity and complicates interpretation.
We could also construct our own linear combination of the variables representing funda-
mentals, but it seems preferable to let this simple statistical methodology do so for us.
32. This is a congenial ﬁnding for those who advance the insurance analogy for IMF pro-
grams. In earlier work analyzing the catalytic eﬀect of the IMF on capital ﬂows, we ﬁnd sim-
ilar evidence of threshold eﬀects, especially for access to bond markets (Mody and Saravia
2003; Eichengreen, Kletzer, and Mody 2006). In particular, countries in an intermediate state
of vulnerability seemed to beneﬁt from improved market access, while others did not.
33. We provide some evidence on this in the following.
34. Dreher and Jensen (2003) take a similar empirical approach but take as their depend-
ent variable the number of conditions attached to a program. Oatley and Yackee (2004) con-
sider instead the political determinants of the size of IMF loans.
35. The authors also use past participation in Fund programs as an instrument. The prob-
lem with using lags of the endogenous variable as an instrument is, of course, that they may
be picking up omitted country characteristics that are slow to change and durably associated
with ﬁnancial problems; see Mody and Stone (2005). Alternatively, we can follow Celasun and
Ramcharan (2005) by using the share of G3 exports going to each subject country as a mea-
sure of the importance the principal shareholders may attach to extending assistance through
the Fund. However this variable turns out to be a poor instrument for the incidence of theaid enters the ﬁrst-stage regression positively, as predicted, and is signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero.36United Nations voting patterns, in contrast, do
not exhibit the expected sign.37Given the counterintuitive sign on this vari-
able, we rely on the speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst column of table 7.10, which ex-
cludes UN voting patterns, for purposes of instrumentation.38
Table 7.11 shows the second-stage estimates. The presence of a new IMF
program continues to negatively inﬂuence the probability of a sudden stop.
Both the statistical signiﬁcance and absolute value of the coeﬃcient are
greater than before. This is to be expected: if susceptibility to a sudden stop
increases the likelihood of an IMF program, then reverse causality will bias
the coeﬃcient in a positive direction; correcting for simultaneity thus yields
a more signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient whose absolute value is larger. Preex-
isting programs are signiﬁcant as well. All this is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that IMF programs provide valuable insurance against sudden stops.
Given the strong policy implications of these ﬁndings, we considered a
number of further robustness checks.
• When we consider the longer period starting in 1984, as in the last col-
umn of table 7.11, the strength of preexisting programs remains. In
contrast, the coeﬃcient on new programs becomes less signiﬁcant. It
would thus appear that the signaling eﬀect of an ongoing IMF com-
mitment to the country is particularly important in the more recent
period. The interaction between new programs and fundamentals re-
mains unchanged even in the longer period, pointing to continued im-
portance of country fundamentals in determining the inﬂuence of
IMF programs.
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IMF program. The coeﬃcient of this variable is consistently negative and signiﬁcant in the
ﬁrst stage regressions of IMF programs. One interpretation is that it is a proxy for the size of
the country, and the larger countries are probably less susceptible to problems necessitating
an IMF program.
36. Use of voting in the UN General Assembly has been criticized in the political science
literature for being dominated by nonconsequential votes and thus containing relatively little
information on political aﬃnity. This is one interpretation of what we ﬁnd in the ﬁrst-stage re-
gressions.
37. Note that we include also a number of addition global and country-speciﬁc variables
that may inﬂuence the decision to approach the Fund (and the Fund’s decision to extend as-
sistance). While these variables do not provide identiﬁcation in the second stage (they do not
plausibly satisfy the exclusion criterion for an instrumental variable), they reassure us that any
signiﬁcance we impute to the U.S. aid in the ﬁrst stage is really attributable to these other char-
acteristics.
38. Of interest also in the determinants of IMF programs are the similarities and contrasts
with the determinants of sudden stops. External debt and debt service indicators work in the
same way (though with diﬀering strengths): more debt and debt service increase the likelihood
of both IMF programs and of sudden stops. In contrast, domestic growth based on high and
growing levels of credit are associated with a lower likelihood of IMF programs. Thus, coun-
tries experiencing such exuberant growth are unlikely to contract with the IMF and remain
susceptible to sudden stops.• As in the preceding, we analyzed whether our results held up when we
relaxed the stringent criteria used to identify sudden stops. First, we
added Brazil and Russia in 1999, two cases that many would regard 
as sudden stops but which are not picked up by our criteria. Second,
we dropped Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ghana, and Pakistan, which drew
on the Fund’s concessional ﬁnancing facilities, indicating that their
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Table 7.10 Determinants of IMF programs
Dependent variable New IMF program in T-1 or T-2
U.S. aid 0.058*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.080***
[3.79] [3.09] [3.24] [3.15] [3.16] [3.15]
Real growth –0.011 –0.027** –0.018* –0.027** –0.018* –0.028**
[1.53] [2.56] [1.76] [2.51] [1.68] [2.47]
Trade balance/GDP 0.024*** 0.047*** 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.046***
[3.49] [3.95] [3.15] [3.69] [3.52] [3.69]
Debt servicing/Exports 0.008*** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009**
[2.95] [2.36] [2.11] [2.37] [2.06] [2.23]
Domestic credit/GDP –0.004* –0.006* –0.006 –0.006* –0.005 –0.006*
[1.83] [1.68] [1.62] [1.71] [1.54] [1.74]
Change in domestic credit/GDP –0.007* –0.006 –0.008 –0.007 –0.007 –0.007
[1.79] [1.23] [1.38] [1.35] [1.25] [1.37]
Debt/GDP 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
[3.84] [3.49] [3.73] [3.70] [3.55] [3.64]
Change in debt 0.002 0.007* 0.009** 0.008* 0.009** 0.008
[0.57] [1.76] [2.29] [1.88] [2.14] [1.89]
Reserves/Imports 0.001 –0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003
[0.63] [0.10] [0.53] [0.19] [0.21] [0.13]
Short-term Debt/Reserves –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
[2.68] [2.76] [2.63] [2.82] [2.58] [2.77]
Exchange rate regime: Pegged 0.28*** 0.45** 0.37* 0.46** 0.40** 0.47**
[2.69] [2.29] [1.86] [2.21] [2.29] [2.27]
Exchange rate regime: –0.006 –0.035 –0.103 –0.071 –0.052 –0.067
Limited ﬂexibility [0.08] [0.27] [0.75] [0.48] [0.41] [0.46]
UN voting –0.045*** –0.046*** –0.046***
[2.92] [3.00] [2.95]
Exposure of U.S. banks –0.004 –0.011
[0.18] [0.51]
Exports by G3 countries 0.017 0.076 0.067
[0.14] [0.60] [0.53]
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.36 0.32 0.37 0.26 0.37
No. of observations 379 284 302 283 303 283
Note: See table 7.7 notes.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3international capital market linkages were qualitatively diﬀerent from
those of the other country samples. The results remained the same.39
• We considered alternative instrumentation strategies. For example, fol-
lowing Oatley and Yackee (2004), we constructed a measure of coun-
try indebtedness to U.S. banks as a further instrument. Adding it has
relatively little impact on the results (perhaps because this variable
turns out to be a relatively weak instrument in this context).
7.7 Extensions
We also asked whether IMF programs reduce the intensity (as opposed 
to the frequency) of sudden stops. For this purpose we constructed our de-
pendent variable as the ﬁnancial account outﬂow if and only if a sudden stop
occurs. Regressions using this dependent variable are estimated by tobit.
The results, in table 7.12, are similar to the earlier probit estimates,
though with some noteworthy diﬀerences. There is stronger evidence for an
increase in high-yield spreads, reﬂecting a rise in risk aversion, to be asso-
ciated with a reduction in capital inﬂows. As before, a rise in oil prices
works in the opposite direction. Among country factors, a high credit-to-
GDP ratio and rapid credit growth are associated with larger capital out-
ﬂows, and a more open capital account regime appears to reduce the
intensity of a sudden stop.40 Compared to new programs, preexisting pro-
grams seem to have a clearer eﬀect in reducing the intensity of capital out-
ﬂows; also while new programs and their interaction with fundamentals
work in the same way as before, the statistical signiﬁcance is weaker. Note
that when new programs are instrumented, the size of the coeﬃcient again
becomes noticeably, even implausibly, large in absolute-value terms. Fi-
nally, when all the relevant IMF variables are included, as in the last two
columns of table 7.12, the precision of the estimates declines.
We also considered the impact of IMF programs on growth around the
time of sudden stops. The raw data in the second panel of table 7.13 sug-
gest the recessionary impact of sudden stops in countries both with and
without Fund programs. Growth is even slower following sudden stops in
those cases where IMF programs are present. But the ﬁnancial balance (in
the ﬁrst panel of table 7.13) is also worse when a Fund program is pres-
ent—suggesting, plausibly, that programs are put in place in cases where
economic circumstances are worse—reminds us that other things are not
in fact equal, and the slower growth cannot be attributed to IMF programs
without further investigation.
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39. In fact, dropping the country with concessional ﬁnancing strengths the results, point-
ing especially to the risks to the others of pegging exchange rates and indicating greater value
to a more open capital account (see appendix A, 7A.1 and 7A.2).
40. Other conditioning variables are less signiﬁcant, though virtually always of the same
sign as in the probit estimates.It turns out to be diﬃcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions about the impact on
output of IMF programs in these episodes. As a ﬁrst cut, we regressed an-
nual growth (again in a country panel covering the period 1990–2003) on a
vector of controls, the presence or absence of a sudden stop, a dummy vari-
able for the presence of a Fund program, and the interaction of the sudden
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Table 7.12 IMF programs and intensity of sudden stops
Dependent variable Financial account outﬂow if a sudden stop occurred
High yield spread 1.38** 1.35** 0.49 1.23* 0.73
[2.17] [2.12] [0.73] [1.74] [1.00]
Change in real oil prices –0.11* –0.11* –0.16** –0.12* –0.15**
[1.86] [1.87] [2.32] [1.93] [2.20]
GDP growth 0.61 0.58 0.97* 0.67 1.04*
[1.30] [1.24] [1.72] [1.26] [1.71]
Trade balance/GDP –0.35 –0.35 –0.32 `0.20 0.17
[0.89] [0.88] [0.74] [0.41] [0.34]
Debt servicing/Exports 0.23** 0.23** 0.16 0.38** 0.29*
[2.16] [2.19] [1.21] [2.50] [1.80]
Domestic credit/GDP 0.20* 0.19* 0.09 0.21* 0.16
[1.81] [1.79] [0.74] [1.67] [1.23]
Change in domestic credit/GDP 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.59*** 0.51*** 0.58***
[3.35] [3.30] [3.41] [3.08] [3.27]
Exchange rate regime: Pegged 1.94 1.96 3.16 6.28 5.69
[0.37] [0.38] [0.50] [1.00] [0.88]
Exchange rate regime: Limited ﬂexibility 2.47 2.56 2.90 3.06 3.34
[0.54] [0.56] [0.63] [0.59] [0.67]
Financial mobility –2.73* –2.57* –3.23** –3.48** –3.62**
[1.85] [1.70] [1.99] [2.06] [2.09]
Existing IMF program –7.98** –7.79** –5.44 –6.48 –5.04
[2.03] [1.99] [1.62] [1.54] [1.46]
New IMF program –4.75 –4.54
[1.60] [1.52]
New IMF program, instrumented –16.94 –12.60 –18.18
[1.56] [1.16] [1.58]
Fundamentals   Program, instrumented 7.80* 6.01
[1.69] [1.27]
Precautionary IMF program –2.32
[0.37]
IMF credit/GDP –1.23 –1.35
[1.30] [1.43]
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects No No No No No
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21
No. of observations 227 227 227 217 217
Note: These estimations are based on the “tobit” procedure, with a cut-off at zero outﬂows.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.stop and the presence of a program (table 7.14). In the benchmark regres-
sion in the ﬁrst column, per capita income in the previous year enters nega-
tively and signiﬁcantly, suggesting some short-term mean reversion. More
rapid U.S. growth is conducive to more rapid recovery in emerging market
countries. A sudden stop leads to slower growth, as expected. The dummy
for the presence of a Fund program is negative and signiﬁcant, with two al-
ternative interpretations: the strict conditionality generally associated with
programs leads to slower growth in the short run or that programs are as-
sociated with weak fundamentals not included in the regression.
Importantly for present purposes, the interaction between the IMF pro-
grams and sudden stops is not signiﬁcant. In other words, even if Fund
programs reduce the incidence of sudden stops, they do not obviously
shape their impact on growth in one direction or the other. We ﬁnd the
same basic results on adding additional ﬁnancial controls in columns (2)
and (3) of table 7.14.
We know from earlier sections that countries with IMF programs are
not randomly selected from the larger population. Before drawing conclu-
sions about their impact on growth, we therefore need to control not just
for observed diﬀerences between program and nonprogram countries but
also for unobserved heterogeneity. In columns (4) to (5) we use the two-
stage Heckman procedure, adding as an additional regressor the Inverse
Mills ratio, denoted Lambda, derived from the ﬁrst-stage regression of the
determinants of IMF programs (in the ﬁrst column of table 7.10).41Sudden
stops continue to exert a negative impact on growth (signiﬁcant in column
[4], insigniﬁcant in column [5], where the ﬁnancial balance is introduced di-
rectly). IMF programs now have a positive rather than a negative impact
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41. Dropping the interaction term allows us to estimate the same relationship using
STATA’s more eﬃcient Heckman procedure (where the selection and growth equations are es-
timated simultaneously). In the present instance, results using the two estimation procedures
are virtually indistinguishable.
Table 7.13 Unconditional growth effects
Sudden Stop
Program No Yes Total
Financial account balance (% of GDP)
No 3.05 –2.73 2.46
Yes 2.23 –6.56 1.61
Total 2.7 –4.01 2.1
Real growth
No 4.18 0.68 3.82
Yes 2.54 –2.5 2.19
Total 3.48 –0.38 3.14on growth (though with weak statistical signiﬁcance). The change in sign
is consistent with the negative coeﬃcient on the Inverse Mills ratio, which
implies that unobserved country-speciﬁc factors that raise the likelihood
of an IMF program also reduce the country’s growth rate. But the t-
statistics leave us reluctant to push any conclusion about this too far. The
key ﬁnding remains: the interaction of sudden stops and IMF programs is
still indistinguishable from zero. Thus, while the presence of a program
may reduce the incidence of sudden stops, there is no evidence that pro-
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Table 7.14 Growth regressions: Effects of sudden stops and IMF programs
GDP growth
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP growth, lagged 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001*
[4.88] [2.60] [1.62] [2.57] [1.93]
Per capita income, lagged –0.064*** –0.066*** –0.057*** –0.062*** –0.050***
[4.90] [3.90] [3.48] [3.64] [3.02]
Sudden stop –0.041*** –0.027*** –0.015 –0.025*** –0.011
[3.88] [2.94] [1.63] [2.72] [1.22]
IMF program –0.013** –0.009* –0.010** 0.007 0.016
[2.31] [1.88] [2.10] [0.55] [1.24]
Sudden stop   IMF program 0.002 –0.004 0.003 –0.006 0.002
[0.09] [0.25] [0.20] [0.40] [0.11]
Debt/GDP –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001***
[4.18] [2.75] [4.56] [3.28]
Change in debt/GDP –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.001***
[7.78] [6.37] [8.51] [7.27]
Debt service/Exports 0.0001 –0.0002 –0.0001 –0.0003
[0.81] [0.12] [0.29] [1.28]




Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 238 230 230 227 227
No. of countries 17 17 17 17 17
R2 0.32 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.58
Notes: Robust t-statistics are presented in brackets. Columns (4) and (5) were estimated to allow for the
possibility of selection bias on account of countries selecting themselves into IMF programs because
they expect slow growth. The two-step “heckman” procedure was used. A ﬁrst-stage selection equation
estimated the probability of an IMF program (using the speciﬁcation in table 7.10, column 1) and the es-
timated inverse-Mills ratio was added to the determinants of growth.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.grams aﬀect short-term output losses, one way or the other, when sudden
stops do occur.
7.8 Conclusions and Implications
In this paper we have presented a ﬁrst attempt to identify the impact of
IMF programs on sudden stops. The literature on self-fulﬁlling crises and
the insurance motive for IMF lending suggests that Fund programs could
reduce the incidence of these episodes characterized by disruptive capital-
ﬂow reversals. In contrast, a literature critical of IMF programs suggests
that such programs, especially those negotiated in the Asian crisis, have
tended to be too small or too late and too laden with burdensome eco-
nomic and political conditions to restore conﬁdence.42
Much of the evidence invoked in this debate is, however, anecdotal. A
more systematic analysis such as that we have sought to provide here is
clearly needed. Our results are broadly consistent with the notion that IMF
programs have some eﬀect in reducing the incidence of sudden stops. The
evidence that negotiation of a Fund program in immediately prior years re-
duces the likelihood of a sudden stop is relatively robust. As economic logic
suggests, this ﬁnding is, if anything, strengthened when we correct for en-
dogeneity. The results further suggest that this eﬀect operates more power-
fully in countries with strong fundamentals, consistent with the insurance
argument.
One should be cautious with these ﬁndings. The literature on the eﬀects
of IMF programs is notorious for its methodological limitations. Coun-
tries approaching the Fund diﬀer systematically from other countries, cre-
ating problems of endogeneity and selectivity. In this paper we have de-
scribed some instrumental-variables strategies and statistical adjustments
for these problems. However, these approaches have limitations, and many
of the same critiques levied against the related literature apply to the results
reported here. These are more reasons for regarding the results as a ﬁrst cut
and not a deﬁnitive guide to policy.
Even if one accepts that there is evidence that IMF programs reduce the
incidence and virulence of sudden stops, this leaves open the question of
whether and how the institution’s lending practices should be adapted. One
view would be that such ﬁndings strengthen the case for a generously en-
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42. Experience during the Asian crisis does not, of course, negate our ﬁndings on the in-
surance value of IMF programs, as when we limit the sample to the 1990s and after we ﬁnd
that preexisting programs were most eﬀective, and in fact programs were not already in place
in the countries with the most severe crises. Thus, in the case of Thailand, it can be argued that
the problem was the absence of a program prior to the sudden stop—and that by the time an
arrangement was negotiated, things had gotten out of hand. In contrast, the Philippines,
which did have a program in place, experienced a milder sudden stop.dowed, quick disbursing, automatic facility for which countries with
strong policies would presumably be prequaliﬁed. A diﬀerent view would
be that prequaliﬁcation is impractical and automaticity is infeasible but
that the Fund can still streamline and enhance access to its resources for
countries with strong fundamentals.43 The results in this paper will not re-
solve this debate, but they will be more grist for the mill.
Appendix A
Sudden Stop Dates and Sensitivity of 
Results to Sudden Stop Sample
As described in the main text, a sudden stop is deﬁned as occurring both
when the ﬁnancial balance is negative, that is there is a capital outﬂow, and
there is a sharp increase in the capital outﬂow, measured by an increase
equal to at least one standard deviation from the country’s own history.
These criteria lead to the identiﬁcation of sudden stops listed intable 7A.1.
As also discussed in the text, there remain ambiguities and close calls in
identifying a sudden stop. Some, for example, would argue that Brazil ex-
perienced a sudden stop in 1999. This would be true if attention was fo-
cused only on non-FDI ﬂows. However, FDI inﬂows partially compen-
sated in that year for non-FDI outﬂows. Another instance widely viewed
as a sudden stop is Russia in 1999, following the events in the ﬁnal quarter
of 1998. Because we have only a short time series on Russia, the measured
standard deviation of the ﬁnancial balance is not very informative. Be-
cause these events are plausible candidates for sudden stops, we examined
if our results were robust to their being so identiﬁed. The ﬁrst column in
table 7A.2 shows that the results remain largely unchanged. The condi-
tioning variables retain their direction of inﬂuence and statistical strength.
A pegged exchange rate regime is clearly associated with a higher proba-
bility of a sudden stop than are more ﬂexible regimes. All the IMF variables
are, in this sample, solidly signiﬁcant.
There is also a concern that sudden stop measured by our procedure may
not always reﬂect the same pressures. Speciﬁcally, countries diﬀer in the
degree to which they have contact with international ﬁnancial markets
and, hence, in the degree to which they are subject to sharp changes in mar-
ket sentiment. One criterion for diﬀerentiating countries in this dimension
is the degree to which they have access to concessional oﬃcial ﬁnance. Pre-
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43. Thus, the IMF’s then managing director suggested in a February 9, 2006,  speech (de
Rato 2006) “an instrument carrying relatively high access, available in a single purchase if a
capital account crisis occurred, subject to a Fund-supported program being in place and on
track.”sumably, countries that can borrow from the IMF on a concessional basis
have less sustained interactions with ﬁnancial markets than countries that
do not so borrow. Four instances of sudden stop are associated with coun-
tries that borrowed on concessional terms: Bangladesh (1998), Bolivia
(1983), Ghana (2002), and Pakistan (1998). Also, it is possible that the
Ghana’s sudden stop is misidentiﬁed to the extent that capital inﬂows were
recorded as an unusual change in errors and omissions. The second column
in table 7A.2 reports the results when these four sudden stops are dropped.
The results stay robust. Finally, in column (3), we add Brazil and Russia
1999 and drop the four countries with concessional ﬁnance. Once again,
our results are conﬁrmed.
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Note: China, El Salvador, Jordan, Jamaica, and India were included in the sample but they
did not have a sudden stop.Table 7A.2 Determinants of sudden stops: Sensitivity to sample composition
Dropped   Added Brazil and Russia 
Added  Bangladesh,  1999 and dropped
Brazil and Bolivia, Ghana,  Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Russia 1999 and Pakistan Ghana, and Pakistan
High yield spread –0.002 0.0004 0.0004
[1.03] [0.08] [0.11]
Change in real oil prices –0.001*** –0.001*** –0.001**
[3.07] [3.18] [2.11]
GDP growth 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.007***
[2.82] [3.35] [3.11]
Trade balance/GDP 0.001 0.0002 0.0002
[0.51] [0.06] [0.20]
Debt servicing/Exports 0.001** 0.0002** 0.001**
[2.37] [2.21] [2.05]
Domestic credit/GDP 0.001** 0.0002*** 0.001**
[1.97] [2.76] [2.39]
Change in domestic credit/GDP 0.001* 0.0002** 0.001**
[1.71] [2.03] [1.98]
Debt/GDP 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.003***
[3.80] [4.34] [3.65]
Change in Debt/GDP 0.001** 0.0001** 0.001**
[2.47] [2.50] [2.51]
Exchange rate regime: Pegged 0.145** 0.188*** 0.238***
[2.41] [2.72] [2.60]
Exchange rate regime: Limited ﬂexibility 0.03 –0.004 0.046
[1.41] [0.22] [1.42]
Financial mobility –0.004 –0.001* –0.005
[1.10] [1.65] [1.25]
Existing IMF program –0.010** –0.002* –0.015**
[1.99] [1.74] [2.10]
New IMF program, instrumented –0.071*** –0.021*** –0.089***
[2.91] [3.25] [2.61]
Fundamentals   Program, instrumented 0.020** 0.005** 0.025*
[1.97] [2.09] [1.82]
IMF credit/GDP –0.011*** –0.003*** –0.014***
[2.58] [4.07] [2.59]
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time ﬁxed effects No No No
Pseudo R2 0.38 0.48 0.48
No. of observations 217 175 175
Note: Dependent variable = indicator for ﬁrst year of sudden stop. Columns reporting probit results
present marginal probabilities, based on the STATA command “dprobit.” Robust z statistics are pre-
sented in brackets. Probability of IMF program estimate as in the ﬁrst column of table 7.8.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.References
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Comment Ilan Goldfajn
This is a very nice and important paper that the authors have written. It
asks the relevant question whether the IMF helps reduce the incidence and
impact of sudden stops. Sudden stops are abrupt declines in net capital in-
ﬂows, leading to balance of payment crises and output losses. Given their
importance and high incidence, it is quite surprising that this question was
not analyzed earlier.
The main results of the paper could be summarized as follows:
II. Economies that have IMF programs in place (existing or recently ne-
gotiated) reduce their probability of suﬀering a sudden stop.
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ies (IEPE/CdG).a. IMF programs work best for countries with stronger fundamentals.
b. Larger IMF programs reduce the incidence of sudden stops.
II. IMF programs do not attenuate the impact of sudden stops on GDP
growth.
Let’s concentrate on the ﬁrst result. Do IMF programs reduce the inci-
dence of sudden stops? The paper provides a clear yes answer to the ques-
tion with convincing evidence: The results hold notwithstanding that there
is a reverse causality (sudden stops generate IMF programs) that tends to
bias the coeﬃcients to zero. When using the U.S. “friendship” instrument
(proxied by U.S. aid to the country and UN voting with U.S. record, bor-
rowed from Barro and Lee), as expected, the coeﬃcients become stronger.
This result is a very important policy issue since it provides evidence in
favor of the insurance role of the IMF. The insurance role is the provision
of emergency ﬁnancial assistance that reassures investors of the country’s
ability to pay its liabilities and avoid costly defaults. This insurance result
gives support to those who would like to strengthen the IMF role in pro-
viding facilities with quick disbursements in order to prevent and reduce
the incidence of sudden stops.
Since larger IMF programs (and not only the existence of a program)
and stronger fundamentals also help reduce the incidence of sudden stops,
the results call for facilities with larger disbursements that are conditional
on economies that follow strong economic policies. This would mimic the
lender-of-last-resort role of central banks: quick, large, automatic facilities
for prequaliﬁed countries.
The results of the paper cannot distinguish completely the insurance role
of IMF programs from other roles of the IMF programs as the signalling
eﬀect: the positive signal that an IMF program in place gives investors re-
garding the willingness of countries to adopt strong measures and also to
pay the existing liabilities.
It is important to note that the insurance role of the IMF is broader than
what the regressions in the paper can capture. The sheer IMF existence
(and potential lender of last resort role) should reduce the incidence of sud-
den stops, even if there are no programs in place in a speciﬁc country. The
lender of last resort role aﬀects expectations even before IMF programs are
designed and take place. It is clear that the insurance role of the IMF is
even stronger than what the results of the paper suggest.
One could even test this broader insurance role using the data in the pa-
per. One could regress the U.S. support proxy on sudden stops. A positive
coeﬃcient would provide a ﬁrst pass evidence for this broader insurance
role (provided one believes that U.S. support increases the probability of
receiving an IMF program ceteris paribus).
Given the importance of the insurance role, one should take seriously
into consideration the moral hazard issue: do countries adopt less strin-
Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs 265gent policies because of the lender of last resort role of the IMF? The pa-
per does not address this issue, but it is clearly an important topic for dis-
cussion.
In this regard, any IMF facility for insurance purposes should target
countries with preexisting conditions (good policies, etc.). The recent
failed IMF’s Credit Contingent Line (CCL) is an important warning for
practical obstacles: the facility failed not only because of the exit problem
(any IMF expelled country is a crisis-prone one) but also because of its
negative signalling (if a country applies, it must believe there is a problem
in the making. It is the Groucho Marx paradox).
The second result of the paper is more negative for the role of the IMF.
Do IMF programs reduce the impact of sudden stop on growth? Although
ﬁgure 7.4 in the paper (and my prior—more reserves to intervene and
avoid the need for sharp current account reversals) suggests this is the case,
the empirical results in the paper do not back this proposition.
In sum, the paper asks very important questions and provides useful pre-
liminary evidence. Further work on the impact of IMF programs on the
costs of sudden stops is needed.
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